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INSTRUMENTALISM ABOUT MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
REVISITED
By Anneli Jefferson
I defend an instrumentalist account of moral responsibility and adopt Manuel Vargas’ idea that our
responsibility practices are justified by their effects. However, whereas Vargas gives an independent
account of morally responsible agency, on my account, responsible agency is defined as the suscepti-
bility to developing and maintaining moral agency through being held responsible. I show that the
instrumentalism I propose can avoid some problems more crude forms of instrumentalism encounter
by adopting aspects of Strawsonian accounts. I then show the implications for our understanding of
responsibility: my account requires us to adopt a graded notion of responsibility and accept the claim
that certain individuals may not be responsible because they are not susceptible to being influenced by
our moral responsibility practices. Finally, I discuss whether the account is committed to allowing the
instrumentalization of non-responsible individuals in cases where blaming them may benefit others’
moral agency.
Keywords: moral responsibility, consequentialism, reactive attitudes, moral influ-
ence, instrumentalization.
When we think about responsibility, we always have one eye to the future and
one eye to the past.We look at agents’ past behaviour and intentions to establish
desert, and we look to the consequences it is appropriate to visit on them in
the future. In his seminal 1961 paper ‘Free will, praise and blame’, Smart put
forward an instrumentalist account of what it means to be morally responsible.
In a nutshell, Smart’s claim is that the ascription of moral responsibility to an
agent and praise or blame are justified if they have the effect of improving the
agent’s behaviour.
If Tommy is sufficiently stupid, then it does not matter whether he is exposed to
temptation or not exposed to temptation, threatened or not threatened, cajoled or not
cajoled. When his negligence is found out, he is not made less likely to repeat it by
threats, promises, or punishments. On the other hand, the lazy boy can be influenced
in such ways. Whether he does his homework or not is perhaps solely the outcome of
environment, but one part of the environment is the threatening schoolmaster. Threats
and promises, punishments and rewards, the ascription and the non-ascription of
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responsibility, have therefore a clear pragmatic justification which is quite consistent
with wholehearted belief in metaphysical determinism. (Smart 1961: 302)
Using the contrast between the stupid boy and the lazy boy as illustration,
Smart argued that all it takes to be a responsible agent is to be an agent who
can be influenced by praise and blame. A consequentialist account of respon-
sibility thus has the benefit of making our practices of holding responsible and
their justification central to the concept of moral responsibility, while avoiding
controversial and, in Smart’s view, incoherent metaphysical commitments to
indeterministic free will. Others, however, have been less impressed. Smart’s
theory has come under fire for misdescribing our practices of holding each
other responsible and inadequately capturing our understanding of moral re-
sponsibility. Critics object that Smart’s proposal neither captures what we take
ourselves to be doing when we make responsibility judgements and hold each
other responsible nor does it capture what we should be doing. The latter point
is important as arguably, most, if not all, accounts of responsibility have a
revisionist element, but it is incumbent on proponents of an account to show
that the revisions they propose improve the account.1
Recently, there has been a revival of (somewhat) instrumentalist accounts
of moral responsibility, or, as Manuel Vargas calls them, ‘moral influence
theories’. Vargas (2008, 2013) has endorsed a partially instrumentalist account
of moral responsibility, as has McGeer (2015), while Arneson (2003) has shown
how Smart’s theory might be revised to address many of the criticisms people
have raised against it.
In this paper, I defend an instrumentalist account of moral responsibility
and argue that it can meet the objections commonly raised against traditional
instrumentalist accounts, either by showing that the objection in question
doesn’t arise on the revised account or that what objectors take issue with is
not actually a problem. I argue that, not only are our responsibility practices
justified by their effects, but that susceptibility to developing and maintaining
moral agency through being held responsible is what makes for responsible
agency. In this, I depart from Vargas, who sees a more limited role for instru-
mentalism as justifying our practices of holding each other responsible and
proposes a separate account of morally responsible agency. Taking up argu-
ments from McGeer and Arneson, I briefly show that instrumentalism can
adopt aspects of more Strawsonian accounts, even though they are normally
considered to be very different types of account (Shoemaker 2015; Wallace
1994). I then show important implications of my view: we can hold on to
the claim that sometimes an individual can be a responsible agent without
blame being useful or beneficial in a specific situation. However, the idea that
1 See Elzein (2013) and McCormick (2013) for a criticism of Vargas’ revisionist account as
failing to meet this criterion.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/pq/article-abstract/69/276/555/5266881 by C
ardiff U
niversity user on 18 O
ctober 2019
INSTRUMENTALISM REVISITED 557
non-responsible individuals, e.g. children, can still be an appropriate target of
our responsibility practices is incompatible with my account. I argue that we
should adopt a graded notion of being responsible and holding responsible
according to which children are partially responsible and this is reflected in
our blaming and praising practices. Finally, I discuss a potential problem for
my account, which is that the justification of our moral responsibility practices
also justifies holding the non-responsible responsible, if doing so benefits others.
In Section I, I outline the role consequentialism should play in an account
of moral responsibility. I then show how the account deals with some of the
standard objections to instrumentalism about moral responsibility and how it
can be brought closer to a Strawsonian account in Section II. In Section III,
I address important implications of my account. One consequence of the link
between susceptibility to influence and moral responsibility is that individuals
whose moral agency cannot be developed through our practices of holding
responsible are not morally responsible. This marks an important difference
to Vargas’ account.
A further consequence is that my account does not allow for cases where
the judgement whether an individual is a responsible agent and the judgement
whether they are a suitable target for our responsibility practices come apart.
Many see children as an example for this kind of case. I argue that we should
accept this result and show how to make sense of the case of children. Finally,
I discuss a morally problematic gap that can open up between being a respon-
sible agent and being an appropriate target for our responsibility practices on
my account. Indirect instrumentalist accounts run the risk of instrumentalizing
individuals because they do not justify holding responsible merely with a view
to the agent who is being praised or blamed, but also through the effects on oth-
ers’ moral agency. This is a troubling problem, but I will argue that in practice,
others’ moral agency does not benefit from blaming the non-responsible.
I. WHAT ROLE FOR CONSEQUENTIALISM?
Instrumentalist accounts of moral responsibility see the practice of holding
accountable as central both to our concept of responsibility and to the justifi-
cation of our practices of holding each other responsible. While many authors
concede that punishment and reward should be sensitive to the effects that
can be achieved by punishing and rewarding, they do not take the putative
benefits of holding individuals to account and sanctioning them to lie at the
core of moral responsibility. Accordingly, Smart’s instrumentalist account is
frequently criticized for missing the point, being overly simplistic, exclusively
behaviourally oriented and insensitive to the psychology of our blaming and
praising behaviour.
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Like other newer instrumentalist accounts, I want to retain the close tie
between responsibility and accountability to others, as well as the idea that
the primary justification for holding others responsible is that this will lead to
moral improvement. I take consequentialist considerations to be central to the
justification of our practices of holding each other responsible. They go beyond
amoral assessment of the quality of the action to a justification of our decision to
hold a person to account for what they did. However, Smart’s account is indeed
unsatisfactory because of its narrow focus on affecting changes in behaviour.
The aim of our practices of holding responsible should be conceived more
broadly. One idea which can be found in the work of Arneson (2003), Vargas
(2013) andMcGeer (2015) is that our practices of holding each other responsible
serve the aim of fostering moral agency or moral reasons responsiveness.
On these accounts, the purpose of people’s practices of holding each other
responsible is to help them develop their sensitivity to moral reasons for action
and their willingness to behave morally.
We should adopt this modification. Rather than merely aiming at compli-
ance with moral demands without concern for the inner states of the creature
one is trying to get to comply, the aim should be to change both moral thought
and action. Furthermore, developing moral agency provides a general, not a
local, justification for our moral responsibility practices (Vargas 2013). This
means that it is not required that every single instance of holding responsible
needs to have a positive effect in order to be justified. Rather, if our practices
overall have the effect of making us into more moral people than alternative
practices would, then they are justified. While this justification for our respon-
sibility practices ultimately appeals to their consequences, it takes a detour via
human psychology and claims that the justification for our current practices of
ascribing responsibility is that they are suited to make creatures like us better
and more responsive to moral considerations. The role of instrumentalism is
therefore more indirect than in Smart’s classic account, it is the general ten-
dency to promote moral agency that justifies our responsibility practices, not
the effect on one specific agent in one specific situation.
However, a justification of our responsibility practices is not yet an account
of what makes a responsible agent. By ‘responsible agent’, I mean the kind of
agent who can, in principle, be praise- and blameworthy and who is the fitting
target of our responsibility practices. Responsible agents are the right kind of
creatures to be part of the responsibility game; blame- or praiseworthiness for
specific actions is a further issue.
What has been presented so far could just be an account of blame and
punishment, praise and reward, not of what people need to be like in order to
be responsible agents. So, on a hybrid theory of moral responsibility, we could
establish responsibility in some independent way but then apply a purely
consequentialist rationale when we decide what to do with the people we
have found to be responsible. In fact, Vargas separates the justification of
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our moral responsibility practices from the account of what makes agents
morally responsible. He provides an independent account of moral agency,
which specifies the capacities an agent needs to possess to count as morally
responsible, as well as a theory of the responsibility norms which specify when
moral praise, blame, etc. are justified.
The approach I take gives a more central role to moral influence. Conse-
quences are not only relevant to justifying our practices of holding each other
responsible. Rather, the fact that their moral agency is susceptible to being
fostered and scaffolded by being held responsible is also what makes an agent
a morally responsible agent, because it is what makes them the right kind of
target for these practices. This allows us to retain the close link between the
purpose of holding responsible and being responsible so central to Smart’s
account. This general account gives us an answer to the question: What kind
of creatures are morally responsible? It does not tell us which actions are
blameworthy or praiseworthy and in what situations (generally) responsible
agents are excused for specific actions. Answering these questions is not the
goal of the paper. My account can be seen as belonging to the same family
as McGeer’s (2014, 2015) and McGeer & Petitt’s (2015) position regarding the
relationship between moral influence and moral responsibility. However, be-
cause I endorse the view that the effect of our moral responsibility practices on
all participants contributes to justifying them, it seems that the justification of
our practices and the verdict whether an individual is morally responsible can
still come apart. The worry is that this happens if blaming the non-responsible
fosters moral responsibility within the moral community as a whole. I address
this problem and offer a solution to it in Section III.2. I also develop the impli-
cations of an instrumentalist account further by proposing a graded account
of responsibility.2
I will now flesh my account out further by showing how it answers standard
objections to Smart’s original account and how it relates to a family of posi-
tions that is often seen as incompatible with instrumentalism, Strawsonian or
reactive attitude accounts of moral responsibility.
II. PUTTING MEAT ON THE BONES
There are a number of related objections to traditional instrumentalist
accounts, many of which target the fact that a purely instrumentalist account
of moral responsibility does not capture the phenomenology of our practices
of holding responsible. Proponents of reactive attitude accounts of moral
2 McGeer (2015) does also give a graded account of moral responsibility in terms of different
levels of reasons responsiveness, but not as a response to the worry about a disconnect between
our practices of holding responsible and the responsibility of the agent.
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responsibility in particular have pressed this point (Shoemaker 2015; Wallace
1994). But in some ways, reactive attitude accounts are quite similar to
instrumentalist accounts, as they, too, take holding responsible as central in ex-
plaining what it is to be responsible and are characterized as forward looking.3
Furthermore, like Smart and other instrumentalists, reactive attitude theorists
claim to have found a notion of moral responsibility which is not hostage to the
metaphysics of free will, but based on our actual moral responsibility practices.
Some authors even interpret Strawson as a consequentialist, pointing to
the fact that he makes much of the desirability of our moral responsibility
practices, irrespective of their metaphysical warrant (Arpaly 2006). McGeer
provides a (controversial) interpretation of Strawson as an indirect consequen-
tialist in her paper ‘P.F. Strawson’s Consequentialism’ (2014). Nevertheless, she
rejects Smart’s account as exemplifying a notion of blame as brute deterrent
intervention. But this criticism can be avoided if Smart’s consequentialism is
modified to aim at morally responsible agency. If we take this step, we can
accommodate a lot of the elements important to reactive attitude theorists.
One reason why reactive attitude theorists are dismissive of instrumentalist
accounts is because they believe that purely instrumentalist views do not do
justice to the interpersonal involvement that is so central to our actual reactions
of praise and blame. Reactive attitudes involve strong emotionally charged
attitudes such as resentment, gratitude, but also guilt or regret from the first
person perspective. Instrumentalist accounts, so the criticism goes, get the
phenomenology completely wrong. Strawson makes the following complaint
regarding consequentialist accounts of responsibility: ‘But the only reason you
have given for the practices of moral condemnation and punishment (. . . )
is the efficacy of these practices in regulating behaviour in socially desirable
ways. But this is not a sufficient basis, it is not even the right sort of basis, for
these practices as we understand them’ (2008: 4). Behaviour management, so
the criticism goes, is not the same as holding responsible. When we punish or
reward a dog in order to discourage or encourage certain behaviour, we are
not holding it responsible. On Smart’s account, it becomes hard to draw the
distinction between holding responsible and operant conditioning.
By targeting responsible agency and responsiveness to moral considerations
rather than morally desirable behaviour simpliciter, many of the implausible
features of instrumentalist accounts are avoided. The broader focus on moral
agency, instead of behaviour alone, allows the new moral influence theorists
to do justice to the psychology of our moral responsibility behaviour in a way
that Smart was unwilling to do.
3 Though this is often interpreted as response dependence aboutmoral responsibility, whereby
our typical reactive attitudes somehowunderwrite an individual’s praise or blameworthiness. This
rather mysterious thesis has recently been worked out and defended by Shoemaker (2017).
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Smart (1961) wanted to give up any and all beliefs and emotions that he took
to be tainted by residual belief in libertarian free will. Arneson (2003) holds that
reactive attitudes may be instrumentally justified even if it turns out that Smart
is right in claiming that they involve some mistaken judgements regarding free
will. There is no reason why an instrumentalist account should not be able to
take on board reactive attitudes, if these are central to reinforcing individuals’
moral commitments and behaviour. Furthermore, considering that the stated
aim of a reactive attitude account is to show how we can have responsibility
without a commitment to libertarian free will, it is at least not obvious that
emotionally charged blaming and praising behaviour is ipso facto committed to
a libertarian notion of free will. Indeed, if the goal is to develop moral agency,
then keeping reactive attitudes such as resentment or guilt in place may well be
a good idea, as the emotional component involved in both our other-directed
and self-directed acts of holding responsible will make praiseworthy acts seem
more desirable and blameworthy ones more undesirable. In a recent paper,
McGeer & Pettit (2015) also stress the importance of our consciousness that our
behaviour will be morally judged by others for developing moral competence
and reasons responsiveness. They argue that the real or imagined reactions
of others to our behaviour and our need to justify ourselves to others help to
scaffold our moral agency.
We can see how an instrumentalist account enriched by reactive attitudes
might work by drawing an analogy to Railton’s (1984) self-effacing consequen-
tialism.4 Even if the ultimate goal of our responsibility practices is to change
behaviour and moral sensibilities for the better, an indirect approach may be
better suited to achieving this aim.We don’t have to have the goal of improving
behaviour in mind every time we make a judgement about blameworthiness
or blame somebody. If we don’t keep our eye on a consequentialist goal in
every single instance, this may have better effects on the development of moral
agency and it will also allow us to have more personally involved relationships,
a worthwhile outcome in its own right. Whether self-effacing instrumentalism
leads to better results is in the end an empirical question,5 but it is certainly
more compatible with close interpersonal relationships than an explicitly in-
strumentalist, detached approach.
What I have said goes some way towards defending the consequentialist ac-
count from Strawson’s criticism of ‘one-eyed utilitarianism’ (2008: 25). Accord-
ing to Strawson, the consequentialist (in his words, the optimist) ‘seeks to find
an adequate basis for certain social practices in calculated consequences, and
loses sight (perhaps wishes to lose sight) of the human attitudes of which these
practices are, in part, expression’ (2008: 25). An account which explicitly makes
room for the value of interpersonal relationships and does not characterize
4 Thanks to Christopher Bennett for drawing this to my attention.
5 There is also some discussion as to whether it is psychologically viable, see Doris (2015).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/pq/article-abstract/69/276/555/5266881 by C
ardiff U
niversity user on 18 O
ctober 2019
562 ANNELI JEFFERSON
our blaming and praising as directly instrumental does not fall prey to Straw-
son’s calculation objection. It can thus retain the phenomenology of our moral
responsibility practices by showing that, when we judge someone to be blame-
worthy and blame them, we need not see this as an educational exercise.
However, some Strawsonians will still see this kind of instrumentalism as
falling prey to a wrong-kinds-of-reasons objections, because they believe that
what makes our blame and praise appropriate gets decided by looking back-
ward at the agent’s conduct and motivations, not by looking forward at the
likely results of our reaction to it; even if we only consider effects for the pur-
poses of the overall justification of our practices of holding responsible, and
not in the heat of the moment. I agree that the evaluation of the agent’s action gets
settled by looking backwards. But once we have evaluated the agent’s action
and decided whether the agent was being wilfully immoral (acted with ill will
or lack of good will), we still need to decide what the appropriate reaction to
such behaviour is. The justification for what reaction is appropriate will lie in
the effect on our interpersonal relationships and the development of moral
agency. Importantly, this means that the justifiability of our reactive attitudes
and our praising and blaming practices will depend on whether they do in fact
foster moral agency, sensitivity to moral considerations and moral behaviour.
If it turns out that current practices of blame and praise are not suited to
achieve this effect, then they should be abandoned where possible. This line
of thought can also be found in Strawson, when he claims that ‘it is far from
wrong to emphasize the efficacy of all those practices which express or mani-
fest our moral attitudes, in regulating behaviour in ways considered desirable;
or to add that when certain of our beliefs about the efficacy of some of these
practices turn out to be false, then we may have good reason for dropping or
modifying those practices’ (2008: 27).
There is some evidence that we should rethink our blaming reactions and
practices in particular. For example, Hanna Pickard has stressed the irra-
tional and unhelpful side of our blaming practices and emotions in recent
work (2013). The claim that our reactive attitudes can, and possibly should,
be subject to change also helps to avoid a certain moral parochialism, which
claims that only people who happen to have the same set of moral emo-
tions and reactive attitudes as we do are morally responsible.6 Not every-
one will be happy with the consequentialist reading of Strawson that I am
pushing here, following McGeer. Some authors see the ineluctability of our
participant reactive attitudes as the central feature of his account, rather than
the more consequentialist elements that I have been stressing. For the pur-
poses of my discussion, not much hangs on how Strawsonian the account
I put forward is. My claim is merely that the consequentialist can adopt a
6 This issue arises for example in the context of autism and moral responsibility (cf. Richman
and Bidshari 2018).
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lot of what is attractive about Strawson, whether we thereby remain true
to the spirit of Strawson’s proposal is a further question. It is likely that
my account will still be too one-eyed and consequence-oriented for many
Strawsonians.
Desert theorists, too, are likely to object to my account on the basis that, by
making responsibility primarily about the reactions that the agent’s behaviour
merits, I am at most supplying a theory of the justifications of blame and
praise. However, responsibility judgements are used to justify (even if only in
principle) appropriate reactions, they go beyond the evaluation of actions as
bad or good. In my view, this is what sets considerations of responsibility apart
from evaluations of actions which proceed by applying a normative ethical
theory of moral and immoral action. The free will debate was, and is, partially
motivated by the question of what agents need to be like for certain reactions
to their behaviour to be justified. Instrumentalist accounts give a distinctive
kind of answer to this, which is that agents have to be such as to be able to
profit morally from participating in our responsibility practices.
While the proposed account is still clearly instrumentalist, it captures more
of the phenomenology of our practices, and because blame- or praisewor-
thiness does not depend on whether blaming a certain individual will have
a positive effect in that instance, it also avoids another problematic feature of
Smart’s account. On Smart’s model, an individual instance of ascribing re-
sponsibility is justified if we can positively influence the agent’s moral conduct
by holding them responsible. On the account Vargas and other instrumental-
ists, myself included, favour, our practices of holding responsible are justified if
they over time and on balance tend to make us into more responsible agents.
In other words, not every individual ascription of responsibility need have the
right effect, it is the aggregate that counts.
There may be instances where my gratitude or indignation may fail to influence anyone
in the proper fashion.Nonetheless,my gratitude (or indignation) can have an appropriate
role, internal to the system of moral influence, because the prevalence of such attitudes
and corresponding practices contributes to the efficacy and stability of the responsibility
system over time. (Vargas 2013: 177)
It follows that someone may be an appropriate target of praise and blame
even if it is unlikely that a specific instance of praise or blame will have the
desired effect of contributing to the development of their moral agency. For
example, p might not learn from blame by x for having done y because they
don’t respect x as a moral authority, but this does not change the fact that
they are in general susceptible to being influenced by their society’s moral
responsibility practices and are therefore a morally responsible agent. They
can therefore be blameworthy for what they’ve done even if they do not benefit
from blame by a certain person at a certain time.
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The refined account is also immune to the criticism mentioned earlier,
which is that holding somebody responsible is pure behaviour management
of the type we might do with dogs, who aren’t morally responsible. We do
not expect dogs to understand why what they are doing is wrong, change of
behaviour is all we try to effect. The fact that the account aims to develop
morally responsible agency and receptivity to moral reasons for action means
it is limited to individuals who can in principle bemoral agents and understand
moral reasons. Dogs do not qualify.
III. IMPLICATIONS
III.1. Being responsible vs being held responsible
Weordinarily believe that whether someone is blameworthy/praiseworthy and
whether they should in fact be blamed or praised are two different judgements,
and that we can sometimes answer one in the affirmative and the other in the
negative. I have already shown that moral influence theories can account for
local cases in Section II. We can judge someone to be responsible because they
have a certain level ofmoral understanding and their reasons responsive agency
can in general be fostered by holding them responsible, but, nevertheless, it
may not make sense for a specific person to hold them responsible in a certain
situation.
However, because morally responsible agency is tied to being susceptible to
moral influence, people who in principle cannot learn from being held morally
responsible are exempt from responsibility on my account. It is sometimes
suggested that this is the case with psychopaths, that they are just incapable
of ‘getting’ moral demands (Morse 2008; Shoemaker 2011). There is room
for debate on how convincing the empirical case for the moral incapacity of
psychopaths is (cf. Godman and Jefferson 2017). However, should it be the case
that they really are not amenable to moral influence and are ‘morally colour
blind’, incapable of developing sensitivity to moral considerations, they would
to that extent not be morally responsible. That does not mean that they cannot
still be legally responsible (cf. Shoemaker 2011), and some of the more blunt
instruments in Smart’s instrumentalist repertoire may still be applicable. But
they would not be morally responsible.
Vargas resists this conclusion because he gives separate accounts for what
makes agents morally responsible and the justification of the moral respon-
sibility system. ‘On the account that I propose, whether the agent is morally
responsible for his or her actions is not a function of a particular agent’s sus-
ceptibility to influence in that particular circumstance, but rather a function of
what the justified norms of moral influence say about the status of responsible
agents in those contexts’ (Vargas 2013: 103).
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It is true that lack of susceptibility in a certain situation is not enough tomake the
agent non-responsible. But my account entails that general unresponsiveness
does exempt. However, exemptions will be very rare, because most humans
are receptive to moral responsibility practices, even if this receptiveness is a
matter of degree.
Some might object to this on the basis that the person who cannot be in-
fluenced still deserves blame and therefore is blameworthy, for example because
they exhibited ill will. Desert, one might argue, is independent from an agent’s
capacity to be influenced. But if certain (actual or hypothetical) individuals can-
not access and understand certain reasons for action (moral colour-blindness),
there is simply no point in trying to engage them in that kind of interaction.
If an individual is not a suitable addressee of our responsibility practices, they
are not a responsible agent. I am here, once again, in agreement with the
Strawsonian, who thinks that for some individuals it may be appropriate to
take the objective attitude and shift to a stance of behaviour management.
This behaviour management may well involve sanctions in order to act as a
deterrent. But it will lack key expectations of moral insight or growth on the
side of the person we are trying to influence by our sanction, and we will not
have the expectation that these agents acknowledge the wrongness of their ac-
tion. Clearly, we will want to err on the side of holding individuals responsible
rather than merely trying to manage their behaviour, but if certain kinds of
interactions and appeals become impossible, then we’ll just have to go the ‘if
you do x, we will do y’ route.
This may sound more counterintuitive than it in fact is, because our notions
of responsibility are tightly wrapped up with judgements of causal responsibil-
ity and evaluations of character. Neither of these are affected. Attributions of
causal responsibility and negative evaluations of action and character will re-
main legitimate. We can still say that psychopaths are depraved, or callous and
that their actions were morally wrong, cruel or whatever the applicable thick
ethical term is. On some theories of moral responsibility, this is still a notion of
moral responsibility, namely attributability responsibility (cf. Shoemaker 2015;
Watson 1996). But this is not the kind of responsibility I am interested in. My
focus is on accountability responsibility, on what we have a right to expect
from others and on the reactions which are appropriate if people do not meet
these expectations.
It follows from my claim that morally responsible agency consists in sus-
ceptibility to having one’s moral agency developed and sustained by moral
influence, that those who cannot develop their moral agency through our
responsibility practices are not morally responsible.
But there might be scenarios where this seems like the wrong result. A
problem case that has been suggested to me is an individual of great moral
wisdomwho, while remaining imperfect, can develop no further. It would seem
that if this individual acts wrongly, they ought not to be blamed onmy account,
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but this is counterintuitive.7 This is an interesting case because it provides a
putative example of an unpalatable disconnect between having acted wrongly
and being blameworthy. However, I would argue that if an agent acts wrongly
in avoidable situations, then there is more moral wisdom and self-control to
be acquired, and external scaffolding through moral responsibility practices
can help with that. In other words, I doubt the psychological plausibility of an
individual who cannot be helped in their moral thinking and acting by being
held responsible. An alternative reading of this case is that these individuals
only fail morally in situations which are extremely demanding. If that is the
scenario, then blame is indeed unwarranted. But this would be due to the
moral demandingness of the task, not due to the fact that the person’s moral
development is, as it were, complete.
A further implication and potential problem case is that, on my account,
talking about the dead being morally responsible is a mistake, because they are
past being influenced by our practices. This is tricky case. On one level, my
account does imply that we should blame and praise the dead, because in as
far as people care about their posthumous reputation, the practice of praising
and blaming the dead will help support moral conduct while individuals are
still alive.8 However, at the time that we blame these individuals posthumously,
it is too late to influence them.
This means that strictly speaking, the dead are indeed not blame- or praise-
worthy. While it is perfectly correct to make the judgement that a certain agent
was responsible and was blameworthy during their lifetime, it would be wrong
to say that they still are. Nevertheless, there are further reasons why people
make these kinds of assessments, beyond the useful pre-emptive function of
these practices just mentioned. By saying that that person was praiseworthy
for what they did, we express our admiration for the action and reinforce our
commitment to acting in similar ways. We are also committing ourselves to the
claim that the person would be an adequate target for praise and blame, were
they alive. This is not to say that we use the term ‘blameworthy’ as shorthand
for ‘should have been blamed if alive’ in these contexts. Rather, it is part of the
self-effacing nature of instrumentalist moral responsibility that outrage and
blaming reactions can, as it were, follow people beyond the grave. We may
genuinely have certain reactive attitudes towards the dead. But onmy account,
the correct thing to say regarding dead people is that they acted well or badly
and that they were responsible at the time and would have been apt targets of
blame. We can also condemn their behaviour, thereby incentivizing the living
who care about their posthumous reputation. But literal talk of dead people
deserving blame is mistaken on my view.
7 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this case and the case of the blamewor-
thiness of the dead.
8 Thanks to Jimmy Lenman for pointing this out.
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As these examples show, different aspects of the account are linked in such a
way that the account of responsible agency does not become untethered from
the justification of our responsibility practices. However, arguably, sometimes
we want our account of responsible agency to be disconnected from that of
being a suitable target of our responsibility practices. Sometimes, we want to
say that a person is not yet or not fully responsible, but nevertheless a fitting
target of our responsibility practices. The most prominent example for this is
that of children, but similar issues arise in the context of those suffering from
mental disorder (Brandenburg 2018). Traditionally, we endorse both the claim
that children are not yet (fully) morally responsible and the claim that they
are appropriate targets for our responsibility practices. Being subjected to our
moral responsibility practices is precisely how they learn to become responsible
agents. Note that this is a different problem from the one I addressed before,
which is whether there are times when a generally responsible agent is not a
fitting target for a specific instance of being held responsible. Here, the question
is whether there can be a disconnect between being a responsible agent and
being a fitting target of our responsibility practices generally. Vargas has no problem
allowing for this, because his theory of responsible agency is separate from his
account of what justifies our responsibility practices. However, on my account,
allowing for responsible agency and being a fitting target of our responsibility
practices to come apart is problematic. And indeed, I will argue that the
characterization above that children are non-responsible but suitable targets
for being held responsible is inaccurate as it stands.
Let’s assume we say that the child is influenceable, as we should, because
in the case of children, far more clearly than in other cases, we blame and
praise, reward and punish in order to influence their future behaviour. In fact,
I think it is no coincidence that Smart’s prominent example of the lazy boy
involves a child, because the function of behaviour modification and moral
education is far more plausible and palatable in the case of children. I point
out to little Jane the wrongness of kicking little Jimmy, I tell her off, ask her
how she would feel if the same was done to her and quite likely also punish
her by withdrawing the half hour of computer games she normally gets in the
evening. Does this mean that I take her to be fully blameworthy? Of course
not. Responsibility comes in degrees, just as moral agency does.9
This is reflected in our judgements, I do not think that Jane is blamewor-
thy in the way I would be blameworthy were I to kick little Jimmy. It is also
reflected in our behaviour: we don’t treat Jane the same as we would someone
older, our blaming behaviour is different. It will be more explanatory and less
harsh, at least in the consequences visited on the child. And for children so
9 This is a fact that has been increasingly recognized in the recent literature; for example,
Coates & Swenson (2013) and Nelkin (2016) defend graded notions of moral responsibility and
praise- and blameworthiness.
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small that they cannot be expected to have a concept of wrongness of action,
we do not indulge in moralized blame of punishment at all. Rather, we rely
on conditioning, reinforcing desirable behaviour, curtailing and discouraging
undesirable behaviour. I do not blame the one year old who hits their playmate
or parent at all, I merely take their hand away and say ‘no’. It is also worth
noting that often, when we hold children responsible, there is an element of
play-acting involved, of trying to impress on them the gravity of what they are
doing without in fact feeling any of the participant reactive attitudes such as re-
sentment characteristic of full blown holding responsible. Strawson uses small
children as an example case of where we take the objective stance and what
we do is not a genuine instance of holding responsible. I believe this is right for
very young children, but would like to stress the continuity between behaviour
management and full-fledged instances of holding responsible. So, rather than
saying that in the case of children, we knowingly hold the non-responsible
responsible, we should more accurately say that we hold the partially respon-
sible partially responsible. There is now growing recognition of the fact that
our practices of holding each other morally responsible lie on a continuum
(Brandenburg 2018), and I take the fact that my account allows for this to be
a strength. However, a consequentialist account can only do justice to this if
it makes the Strawsonian adjustments I have suggested, whereby the kind of
interpersonal moral engagement changes as the moral agency of the target of
our responsibility practices develops. If all holding responsible were behaviour
management, the difference between what we do with small children, bigger
children and adults could not be captured. Another important feature of my
account that comes out of this is that we cannot say that responsibility is pro-
portional to the susceptibility of being influenced. Otherwise, children would
be more, not less responsible than adults. Rather, it is being susceptible to
moral considerations and the capacity to be moved and influenced by moral
reasons to act or refrain from acting which is relevant to responsibility.
III.2. Worries about instrumentalization and the scope of consequentialism
One of the worries McGeer raises about Vargas’ account is that because it has
a separate account of what justifies our responsibility practices and of what
constitutes a morally responsible agent, there is the danger of a justificatory
gap, whereby the general effectiveness of our practices would justify holding
someone responsible who does not count as responsible according to the
separate account of responsible agency (2015).
Following the discussion above, which illustrates the close link between
being susceptible to moral influence and being a responsible agent, one might
think this problem is elegantly taken care of in my account. Unfortunately,
things are not quite so simple. I have argued that instrumentalist accounts
can justify our responsibility practices by looking at the effect on both the
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blamers/praisers and those who are blamed and praised. So the target of our
practices includes all people who take part in these practices and whose moral
agency can be furthered by them. However, this once again raises the worry
that the justification for blaming someone might come apart from the agent’s
responsibility in unacceptable ways. If what justifies blaming and punishing
is the overall effect, we might end up with the following situation: assume
that the moral community benefits from blaming someone who doesn’t in fact
meet the criteria for blameworthiness. Could that person not still be justifiably
blamed if doing so benefits enough others?
Allowing effects of praise and blame other than those on the person who
has done something morally good or bad to justify our practices would seem
to reintroduce the common quandary familiar from consequentialist accounts
of punishment, that they justify punishing the innocent. A troubling variation
of this problem arises on my account—if the person who has done something
wrong cannot benefit from being held responsible, they aren’t responsible
on the criteria for responsibility that I have proposed, but we might still be
justified in holding them responsible because of further effects on others.
While I cannot fully resolve the issue within this paper, I will sketch what
I take to be a plausible response.
It is important to note here that the problem which arises is not that of
blaming the innocent (so the ones who haven’t done anything wrong) but that
of blaming the non-responsible (those whose moral agency cannot be affected
by being held responsible). The account would not categorize agents as re-
sponsible merely in virtue of it being useful to others to hold them responsible.
Whether a given subject is a responsible agent gets decided by whether they
are capable of developing and maintaining responsiveness to moral consider-
ations (reasons responsiveness) through taking part in our moral responsibility
practices. Rather, the problem for this account is one of instrumentalization,
that it seems as though we might be justified in blaming someone who does
not count as responsible if our own or others’ agency benefits from doing so.
That person would then function as a tool for others’ moral development.
Applying this to Smart’s example, we may want to hold the stupid boy
responsible for his non-achievement because others might benefit from being
impressed with the importance of working hard and the negative repercussions
of not working hard. Interestingly, this is not a justification Smart considers;
rather, he is interested in capturing as much as possible of our judgement that
a certain individual is responsible, and that judgement is different from the
one that it would be good for others’ moral development if we treated them as
responsible.10
10 However, as Arneson (2003) points out, this does not mean that, as a Utilitarian, Smart
would not have been happy with the idea of holding the lazy boy responsible if the overall effects
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At this point, we are faced with four options:
1. We could bite the bullet and concede that blaming and punishing those
who don’t meet the responsibility criteria is justified if there is enough
benefit to others.
2. We could drop the notion that influence on the assessor and the spectator
can also justify our responsibility practices.
3. We can try to resolve this question by explicitly positing that being a
responsible agent (i.e., being susceptible to moral influence) is a necessary
condition for being a fit target for praise, blame, reward and punishment,
which cannot be outweighed by any other benefits.
4. We can attempt to show that it does not benefit others’ responsible agency
to hold the non-responsible responsible.
We should choose options 3 and 4. We should take the benefits for others
to be secondary to those for the target of blame, praise, etc. These benefits
cannot trump the agent’s right not to be blamed when they are not blamewor-
thy (either because they haven’t done anything wrong or because they do not
meet the responsibility criteria). A standard objection to this is that once one
endorses an instrumentalist account of responsibility, one is thereby commit-
ted to going the whole hog and applying consequentialist reasoning across the
board. It may seem ad hoc to say that consequentialist justifications for moral
responsibility justify our practices but are still subject to a fairness constraint,
whereby we should not blame the non-responsible. Consequentialists, so the
objection goes, cannot help themselves to fairness considerations, as they are
all about maximizing the good. Does an instrumentalist account of moral
responsibility commit us to consequentialism as an ethical theory? I take this
concern to be easily addressed. Being a consequentialist about moral respon-
sibility does not commit one to being a consequentialist across the board, a
fact that Vargas stresses repeatedly in Building Better Beings. Consequentialist or
instrumentalist accounts of moral responsibility address the question: What is
the appropriate reaction to morally wrong (or right) action? They do not ad-
dress the question:What is the correct normative theory of what makes actions
right or wrong? Of course, anyone who thinks that consequences should be
completely irrelevant to normative theory will struggle with an instrumentalist
account of moral responsibility. But the thought that consequences are morally
relevant is compatible with further constraints on normative theories, such as,
for example, rights.
The worry regarding instrumentalization can be further defused by denying
the assumption that we can develop our ownmoral agency by blaming the non-
responsible. Blaming the non-responsible involves moral mistakes regarding
were beneficial. But that would be a further consideration, less tightly linked to the question of
our judgement as to whether someone is responsible in the first place.
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morally reasons-responsive behaviour and what we can (and should) expect
from an agent with a certain set of capacities. Take an example that can
frequently be found in the (British) news, where severely autistic, non-verbal
teenagers who are also mentally handicapped physically attack their families
in situations of stress. These cases are tragic, and restraint and some kind of
behaviourmanagement are clearly called for. But it would not develop anyone’s
moral agency to treat these individuals as fully blameworthy. Instead, it would
show lack of compassion as well as lack of understanding of what it takes
to be a moral agent. Clearly, whether blaming the non-responsible furthers
anybody’s moral development is an empirical question, and matters get more
tricky in borderline cases, such as the one of psychopaths, where the question
whether they are morally responsible is significantly more controversial. Here,
I am only sketching the broad outline of an instrumentalist account of moral
responsibility and how it should respond to the most important objections
against it.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have argued that instrumentalist accounts, suitably revised, can meet the
criticism that they describe mere mechanisms of behavioural modification.
Behavioural modification is part of what instrumentalist accounts of moral
responsibility aim for, but their target is more ambitious, they want to foster
moral agency. They can accommodate reactive attitudes in a way Smart’s ac-
count cannot, though the suitability of our current practices is dependent on
whether they actually help us become more reasons-responsive moral agents.
However, the account cannot and does not aim to give an account of blame-
worthiness which is independent of being a suitable object for having one’s
agency developed through our responsibility practices. This means that moral
responsibility is determined by looking forward just as much as it is by looking
backwards at what a person has done.
There are two important issues which I have not been able to address in
this paper: One is whether the account I propose changes the meaning of
the term ‘moral responsibility’ to the extent that I am, in effect, not talking
about what other people are talking about when they use that term. This is
an objection frequently levelled against revisionist accounts such as Smart’s
or, more recently, Vargas’ (McCormick 2013; McKenna and Pereboom 2016).
It is an important objection, which merits extended treatment. My very short
preliminary answer is that most worked out accounts of responsibility involve
some amount of revision, as it is unlikely that we have a consistent set of
intuitions about moral responsibility. Accordingly, I suspect that the charge of
not capturing what we mean by ‘moral responsibility’ is one which applies not
just to card carrying revisionist accounts, and that the more pressing question
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is whether the revision is a desirable one that we should endorse. I have argued
that it is.
Another issue that merits further discussion is which actions individuals are
morally responsible for. To clarify: I have talked about what it takes to be a
morally responsible agent, but I have not addressed the question when even
morally responsible agents might be excused for doing bad things or shouldn’t
get credit for behaviour with good outcomes. I have not addressed the effect
of coercion, manipulation, stress, etc. on responsibility for action. This is the
area where normative ethics and theories of moral responsibility bleed into
each other, and it is the bread and butter of many discussions in the literature
on moral responsibility. Let me just briefly gesture at the way I think we
should go: Our normative theory of choice decides whether and why a certain
action is wrong. The extent to which a person is blameworthy when there is
an excusing factor such as, for example, coercion will be determined by how
difficult it was for them to do the right thing and what we can expect from
agents in situations of coercion. If it appears that even a maximally morally
sensitive person would have failed at that hurdle, then blame or praise is
unjustified and pointless. While more work needs to be done to fully articulate
an instrumentalist account of moral responsibility, the purpose of this paper
has been to rehabilitate it as a respectable theoretical option by showing how
it deals with important objections.11
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